The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century

The second factor outlining the debate was concerning the security relationship that the United States shared with other nuclear states and other nuclear countries like Russia, China and North Korea. The third factor is the question of evaluating the level of investments that is to be allotted to the nuclear force of the country for the purpose of their maintenance and modernisation. This evaluation of the nuclear deterrence and posture of the state are received with three different takes – the abolitionist group, the pro-nuclear weapons section who consider them to be necessary for the security of the country, and the third group that adheres to a balanced approach regarding the significance of nuclear weapons in the defence policies of the country (p. 2). The Obama administration worked towards promoting the third approach to nuclear policy-making (p. 3).

Brad Roberts, through this book, aims to contribute to future discussions on nuclear policy and the posture of the United States through certain objectives. These are to work towards bringing down the reliance on nuclear weapons to maintain national security. The book also delineates the lessons learnt from adopting the balanced approach towards nuclear deterrence in the 21^st century, and finally also to reduce the cracks in the deterrence debate. The first chapter delineates the post-Cold War modifications in the nuclear doctrines, policies and nuclear posture of the United States by tracing their gradual reduction in the nuclear arsenal of the country. The second chapter looks into the issue of regional proliferation of nuclear power in non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) of Asia like Iran and North Korea. It dwells on how countries in West Asia who were engaged with proliferating nuclear power gave up their nuclear programs post the numerous conflicts and operations conducted by the United States. To explain the intentions and capabilities of North Korea, Roberts brings in a three stages scale of conflict escalation/ de-escalation spectrum to demonstrate the North Korean challenge from the least to the highest risk situations (p. 75). This suggests North Korea’s intent towards developing a ‘red theory of victory’ like Russia and China who are also very likely to develop such a preventive and credible theory as a deterrence measure. Chapter three outlines the ‘blue theory of victory’ of the United States along with its allies, which is a reaction to the ‘red theory of victory’ to deter the nuclear blackmail and brinkmanship tactics by the adversaries of the country (p. 96).  Both these theories of victory draw their inspirations from the classical works of Carl Von Clausewitz and Sun Tzu to maintain effective deterrence in both peacetime and war (p. 105). Chapters four and five analyse the relationships that the United States shares with Russia and China respectively. It analyses the effort put in by the leaders of the countries to improve and stabilise their bilateral relationships with the United States. In the case of Russia, the effort to modify the focus from nuclear weapons in the deterrence and strategic relationship has not yielded much success. However, in the case of China, it shows the mixed result of economic cooperation and the need to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis China. Chapter six, seven and eight focuses on the concept of ‘extended deterrence’; it implies the presence of a nuclear security umbrella provided by the United States to its allies in Europe and North-East Asia. This brings into the spotlight the central question of the reliability of this deterrence guarantee against nuclear threats. In the case of Europe, it is Russia which is seen as the threat as the latter considers NATO an adversarial organisation. Chapter nine sets down the ‘lessons’ that the Obama administration and the preceding administrations might derive which imply that the current political and security environment is not conducive for the United States to go down the path of nuclear disarmament secondly, the US should also persuade other NWS to join hands on the road to gradually lessen the dependence on nuclear weapons for the primary national security of their respective countries (p. 239). The epilogue of the book dwells on the importance of modernising the U.S nuclear capabilities to maintain its credibility and the significance of de-escalating the role of nuclear weapons to maintain a balanced nuclear strategy for the state in the future. Additionally, the time is currently not apt for the U.S to move towards disarmament, but rather to maintain stability in the sphere of international security.

 The extensive work, however, is not without its flaws. It is more ingrained along the lines of being policy-prescriptive rather than norm-oriented. The United States is one of the major states in the global world order and cannot afford to toe the line in these norm-oriented institutions. However, under the current Donald Trump administration with his tendency to go back on international treaties such as invalidating the TPP and the Iran nuclear deal, the future for working on the balanced approach to nuclear weapons doesn’t look too promising. The book benefits students of nuclear politics and security studies.

In addition to the academic community, Brad Robert's book is a useful and engaging read for academics, government officials, and those involved in the formulation of nuclear policy. The depth of the book's research is evident in its thorough narrative, which is where its relevance rests.