Is China defining maritime order in South China Sea?
South China Sea occupies a strategic foothold in the global maritime order for several reasons such as being the flagbearer of naval modernity, sea trade and resource extraction. The region witnesses a dynamic interplay of maritime nationalism and geostrategic rivalry across the ocean and seas. China’s presence in the region has had an escalating effect on its relationship tensions between United States and the littoral countries of East Asia. The maritime situation today represents a similarity with that of a time earlier. Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius spoke about the need for an international law of codification to define sea exploration for navigation and trade. Now again, the great maritime interplay has changed its course acquiring new players but concerning the same question of control as before.
China acts as the central character in this maritime renaissance, aiming to secure its control as a maritime country establishing its strong foothold in the epicenter of geopolitics. It is safe to say China acts in a way to join the links between its past and present such that it would produce inevitable positive or negative consequences. It is also important to understand that all of this is happening when the power today is more diffused, economic and security interests overlap greatly, and national interests have a direct bearing on the global challenges and the opposite as well. Therefore, while South China Sea is one of the most contentious regions in the global political-economic space today. Understanding the political and legal issues separately itself is a challenging task, it becomes even more complex when external constraints and determinants increase.
It covers a vast space of water with approximately 3.5 million square kilometers surrounded by China and South East Asian littoral states such as Vietnam, Malaysia, Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, and Indonesia. The region hosts a net traffic of around 40,000 ships annually constituting 40 per cent of the global sea trade. Strait of Malacca in its south west strategic shortest navigational route between Europe and pacific Asia along with commerce and energy potential beyond realization. It also faces intense competition over fish stocks and oil gas exploration. It not only encompasses the hoard of positive avenues but also the negative trends of piracy and organized crime. South China Sea superseded Gulf of Aden as the most dangerous region of the world in 2014. Increasing conflicts between neighboring nations over marine resources and maritime jurisdictions have fueled a significant rise in armed robberies and port attacks.
One of the first and foremost claims of China in the South China Sea is its claim to indisputable sovereignty over the four islands – the Spratlys, Paracels, Pratas and Scarborough shoal. Assessing the rightfulness of Chinese claims becomes difficult on several grounds such as confusion in the names, changing claims of parties involved and numerous geological formations. China’s dispute with Vietnam also highlights the continued contention over resources.
Both the countries have claimed sovereignty over Spratly and Paracel based on their historical roots. Therefore, it can be safely suggested that based on its current foot holding, China claims to control approximately 80 per cent of the South China Sea. It also uses the nine-dash line to cover the remaining territory as part of its “historic waters” claim.
China also projects its control through physical presence in many small islands around the region. For instance, it seized control of the Scarborough shoal from the Philippines in 2012 and stationed its Tianjin dredger there for weeks. It also established it administrative base at Paracels in 2012. Some analysts have observed a pattern of intimidation in action to be used by Chinese strategists. It has been accused of threatening and exploiting energy companies to the point that it is now referred to as the policy of “salami slicing”, where in the parties involved are in a constant state of conflict and competition, severe enough to have an impact on the region’s stability and resources.
While witnessing what one may call China’s attempt at unappalled hegemony in the region, it would be wrong to assume that it sheers away from any attempt at resolution. The China-ASEAN maritime cooperation fund was established in 2011 to further regional maritime cooperation. Similarly, China also expressed its willingness to negotiate over a formal code of conduct under the declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea region in 2002. Chinese premier Li Keqiang also promised commitment to a dual track approach in the South China Sea, where in mediation and consultations will form the primary mode of resolving disputes in the region. However, looking at the current pattern of confrontation, it seems like the above-mentioned mechanisms could not accomplish much progress as these lacked a binding legislation to enforce an accountable code of conduct. China’s imposition of fishing ban for three months and revising its Coastguard law to allow uses of firearms and shooting to protect its so call demarcated maritime zones would aggravate problems. Further, the response from major powers has been occasional and at times not more than a strong statement. The military option has not been enforced.
A broad picture of Chinese activity suggests that China appears to have adopted a mixed strategy of consolidating its growing maritime power while at the same time balancing its national interests to act as a pragmatic partner. This will facilitate greater cooperation with the neighboring nations and enable better regional stability with big powers like the United States. China follows a policy of maritime nationalism trying to defend its maritime periphery. The present global order is one based on interconnectivity and interdependence. While China refuses to directly comply with the norms of international law and peace, unless it serves its direct interest, what is imperative is that a way out is recognized such that china’s interests align with those of the international community. No conflict can be left to itself as each has the potential to develop into a domino effect. The real issue in the South China Sea is not as to who defines its maritime periphery, but as to whose rules must define it. While the United States engaged littoral states which have tried to balance US with rising power China, as it appears more conventional, the existing realities are ever changing.
The region suffers from a crisis of uncertainty based on a hierarchy that seeks to prioritize stability over legitimacy. What the region needs in fact is the risk of order building to reinforce a status quo. Other than this, a stable maritime order requires an evolving maritime policy based on social consent of the nations involved, mediating institutions such as United Nation law of the seas (UNCLOS) and finally an attempt at consolidation towards conflict prevention and resolution.
References
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Pic Courtesy - Vietnam News Agency
(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent views of CESCUBE.)
