Evaluating ASEAN Defence Ministers Plus meeting and its relevance in regional security
India recently attended the 14th meeting of ADMM (Asean Defense Ministers Meeting) plus virtually at Hanoi, Vietnam in December 2020 to mark 10 years of its inception since it’s convening in 2010. The ADMM-Plus is a platform for ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and its eight Dialogue Partners. It include ten ASEAN Member States and eight Plus countries, namely Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, and the United States. The current meeting spurred significant attention due to the current standoff between India and China over the Line of action at Ladakh and the continuing contention over South China Sea in the region.
The strategic utility of ADMM plus as a forum for ASEAN and its role in collective regional security has assumed significant importance in the recent past. ASEAN defense ministers plus meeting was established as a platform in 2006 in order to provide an institutionalized character to intra and inter-regional cooperation and security in the region. The platform has since then played an enabling role in advancing greater engagement of ASEAN member countries with their security partners. The fact that ADMM plus came into existence twelve years after ASEAN’s forthcoming, prompts us to pay close attention to the fact that there might have been critical apprehensions on the part of ASEAN whether to go all out in security matters or not. However, the ASEAN regional forum until then suffered from the crisis of diminishing functional utility in terms of regional security and cooperation. It wouldn’t be wrong to argue, that it was only with the formalization of ADMM plus that ASEAN occupied the front seat in military establishment and its membership gained a structured regional framework.
ADMM plus further plays a central role in capacity building within the region, intensifying bilateral and multilateral interactions through logistical support, better communication and institutional efficiency by engaging countries in a mutually trustworthy sustained environment. Its singular focus on Southeast Asia makes its role imperative for the region’s future sustainability. It not only enables better inter regional show cause but also over a period of time has been known to have enhanced the ASEAN countries military capabilities and standards. It carries forward the central ASEAN objective of building cooperation over shared security challenges, mindful of enhancing the different capacities. Another important role played by ADMM plus is of military engagements which go far beyond just diplomatic ties, facilitating coordination between geographical entities of ASEAN, who otherwise may have found interaction critical. For example, for Laos to engage in a maritime security exercise with japan without any established defense links would have been a tumultuous task, which now stands bridged with ADMM plus. Also, the fact that ADMM plus deals with traditional and non-traditional security issues separately ensures that power relations in the region remain unaffected.
Besides, being a relatively newer platform, ADMM plus provides a neutral space for cooperation, free from past baggage of rivalry and hostility. One of the crucial roles that the forum has been applauded includes its uptake of extra regional states into centrally lead responsible roles, undoing the past criticism that ASEAN has suffered for relegating a passive role to ASEAN member countries. One of the strategic advantages of incorporating the plus countries is their substantive capabilities of skill set and training. Such an active responsibility sharing also ensures better integration in the region as the baton is not restricted to military capability alone but values leadership qualities and defense diplomacy. Therefore, it would be quite appropriate to suggest that ADMM plus in a way furthers the objective of centrality that ASEAN as a forum envisions. It is only through the openness and inclusive nature of ADMM plus structural framework, that both the military and non- military partners exercise leadership and engage as equals, garnering strengthened regional security.
However, while it has made considerable progress at taking all the countries and moving ahead together, it is not without obstacles. The foremost challenge that ADMM plus faces is that of striking the correct balance of membership between efficiency and legitimacy. It must be restrictive in its membership to ensure responsiveness but also be representative enough for the region, including all the important stakeholders. The second challenge deals with restructuring of the institutional framework which must remove the delay causing burdened expert working groups through periodic reviews, thereby enabling better responsiveness and relevance in the region. In this regard, one of the approaches that has been suggested is that of “mini-literalism”. This would mean cooperating in small clusters instead of the usual ASEAN way of the “all- inclusive” regional cooperation. Another challenge it faces is with regard to its relegation of its non-traditional security role. While it strengthens the plus countries cooperative character and leadership, it poses a significant challenge to ADMM plus’s continuing relevance for ASEAN and its upcoming traditional security challenges in the region.
One of the critical bone of contention with regard to ADMM plus countries’ relevance remains the arrangement of US-China engagement. Their confrontation and cooperation continues to bear significant outcomes for the forum’s regional defense diplomacy, as it was evident in the third meeting of ADMM plus in 2015, where no conclusive decision could be made over the South China Sea issue. In the long run, this can even mean to hinder the centrality of ASEAN and result into a dynamic of power blocs. One way to avoid this would be that the ASEAN and ADMM Plus redefine their engagement to less critical issues and avoid overlap. Instead, cooperating on issues of common concern which are slightly less sensitive, such as cybersecurity and piracy. Both need to cooperate on issues which further a more community based outlook, enabling a better interconnected region. Plus countries also must invest in capacity building so as to overcome interoperability issues.
While it is acknowledged as an defence forum, it is also important to recognize the greatest achievements of ADMM plus has been its capacity to enable engagement in a non-politicized manner, especially given the clashing interests of regional parties to the organization. For instance, despite the deteriorating relationship between Singapore and Indonesia due to naval warship’s deadly bombing in Singapore, the two countries actively cooperated in regular meetings aiming at establishing a positive momentum for dialogue.
ADMM plus exhibits great potential not only for a secure and sustainable Southeast Asia, but also towards India’s Indo-Pacific dream. India’s emphasis on an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific, which is based on the principles of mutual trust and cooperation is very much appealing to the sound of ADMM plus objectives. Not to forget, whether ADMM plus is what it aspires to be or not, the pandemic has made it very evident that any and every organizational support is much appreciated and such a threat requires coming together on all fronts.
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Pic Courtesy-ASEAN.ORG
(The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent the views of CESCUBE.)